A Perfect Storm: Hamas Terrorist Escalation

AUTHOR: David Brannan

Originally published by Homeland Security Affairs in December 2024

Abstract

This paper considers terrorist escalation of violence through an analysis of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel.  The context and actions are evaluated using the Social Identity Analytical Method (SIAM) as applied to publicly available open-source material three months after the attack.  The analysis suggests that both internal and external in-group perceptions and narratives, as well as patronage lines and leadership, continue to impact a terrorist group’s efforts to escalate violence. In line with the Terrorism Studies literature, this investigation shows that the Hamas escalation of violence is directly linked to Hamas’ attempt to communicate their political message. Finally, the findings indicate that counterterrorism efforts should take seriously how static and/or brittle security environments account for the dynamic ‘learning organization’ nature of terrorist groups. This is particularly true in the “narrative conflict” world in which homeland security practitioners operate.

Introduction

Hamas significantly escalated their use of violence and ferocity against Israel.[1] In a highly coordinated and yet surprise attack by land, sea, and air, thousands of terrorists breached technological and physical barriers and targeted both civilians and military personnel.[2] Nearly 1200 Israelis were killed, with more than 5000 wounded and 240 taken hostage during hours of violence and well-coordinated maneuvers intermixed with widespread episodes of what can only be described as chaotic rampage.[3] All of this occurred amidst an environment of sustained military, law enforcement, and border security defenses that few knowledgeable people believed could be substantially breached by Hamas, especially in such an overt manner.[4] 

Three elements came together to allow—and perhaps even drive—the October 7th ‘perfect storm’ of escalated terrorist violence. The first is what might be described as a confident complacency on the part of the Israeli security regime, rooted in perceptions of Israeli intelligence superiority and military invincibility.[5] The second element is the internal and external political contexts in which Israel and Palestinians found themselves. On the one hand, the Israeli population and government were polarized and distracted by ongoing internal political wrangling.[6] At the same time, Palestinian leaders feared the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab countries in the region, which many believed would leave Palestinians in a position less likely to result in achieving statehood.[7]  Most importantly, however also dependent upon these other contextual realities, the third element is the emergence of two capable Hamas leaders who recognized that the status quo levels of violence between Hamas and Israel no longer effectively communicated their political message.[8] These Hamas leaders’ perceptions of relative deprivation, coupled with a fear that “time was running out,” created the context for terrorist violence escalation.

This paper considers why Hamas chose to significantly escalate their violence profile and tactics against Israel at the time they chose to do so.  The analysis was made three months after the attacks, and the author is aware that new details will come to light with time. The context and actions are evaluated using the Social Identity Analytical Method (SIAM) as applied to publicly available open-source material.[9]  The analytical framework organizes and supports insights into what follows by focusing on social psychological in-group and out-group motivations while also remaining firmly rooted in terrorism studies scholarship. The approach is intended to afford security-focused decision makers with what Phillip Mudd has appropriately labeled a “decision advantage” in evaluating this significant transition by the long establish terrorist group.[10] 

Importance of setting the ‘contextual table’ for decision-makers

This analysis suggests that regional and local Palestinian leadership and the internal Israeli context created a perfect storm for Hamas’ significant escalation of violence. Implicit in these contextual challenges are governmental, analytical, and technical assumptions by Israel that further contributed to vulnerable conditions for a successful attack by Hamas.[11] Additionally intertwined with these contextual assumptions are fixations on a moral, rather than political, analysis of why terrorist organizations use this type of violence.[12] 

Understanding the contextual sitz im leben for terrorist action is essential for practitioner and security-focused leaders. As Bruce Hoffman makes clear in his foundational work, Inside Terrorism, terrorist violence is “ineluctably political in aims and motives” that “seek to communicate a particular message to a particular target audience.”[13] When women, children, the elderly, and other non-combatant innocents are being targeted in a way that is an affront to salient cultural norms and mores, it is understandable how one may be emotionally blinded by horror.[14] Nonetheless, effective security leadership by practitioners, policymakers, and terrorism specialists requires that we frame—and investigate—analytical queries rather than be driven solely by emotional and moral (i.e., securitized) lines of questioning and analysis.

An analysis that is dominated by an emphasis on the emotional tragedies of killing non-combatants leaves aside fundamentally important analytical questions of why Hamas leadership made this escalation of violence against Israel and why now. If policymakers  and security-focused  decision-makers  are to be more effective at countering this type of violence, we must focus on foundational terrorism studies truths emphasized by Hoffman, such as his premise that the use of targeted political violence is an attempt at rational in-group political communication to a target out-group and the broader international community.[15] That does not make the violence just. That terrorist attacks are painful, tragic, immoral, and horrific is without question. However, an answer to the analytical rather than emotional question “Why?” is, in part, what might move us closer to creating a sustainable security environment. No justification is intended in the attempt to explain the relevant context below, and I condemn the use of violence against non-combatants. At the same time, this analysis intentionally avoids efforts to justify action or reaction through commonly used timeline approaches to what happened, as timelines often reflect the presuppositional hermeneutic and position of the commentator rather than the analysis of interaction between social groups.[16]  These contextual considerations frame the pressures and incentives for Hamas’ escalation of violence, as observed on October 7, 2023.  

Complacency rooted in perceived invincibility

Contextual issues contribute to and frame “why” Hamas radically escalated their violence profile. Various contextual elements help us understand why the escalation happened when it did. To begin, I briefly sketch the contours of some of these assumptions in relation to perceived Israeli intelligence and military capabilities, which are foundational to the events.

Israeli military and intelligence hegemony

Israel fought wars with neighboring Arab states in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1969, 1973, and 1976, as well as wars against non-state actors in Lebanon in 1978, 1982, and 2006.[17] These military conflicts contributed to Israeli national priorities as well as the perception by their enemies of Israel’s tenacity and effectiveness. The priorities included achieving regional military superiority and deterrence capabilities and maintaining  a perception of absolute intelligence infallibility.[18]  Military deterrence was maintained through superior firepower  and technical capability mixed with “an underdogs’ sense of exceptionalism.”[19] While military and intelligence superiority arguably held hostile Arab regimes at bay, Palestinian and Lebanese sub-national groups continued to harass Israel with more or less  sustained attacks against civilians, settlers, police, and the Israeli military.[20]

Today, many argue that Israel achieved regional supremacy in military and intelligence capability.[21]  Other regional states—notably  Iran and Saudi Arabia—seek to disrupt that position.[22] A critical factor contributing  to Israel’s hegemony is its reliance on technology as a means to achieve superiority across the defense and security systems, and—moreover—the significance of the Israeli-American relationship in enabling that technological superiority. The Israeli emphasis on technology as a means to achieve security has benefited from steadfast American commitment (with commensurate economic exchanges) and a substantial—though not absolute backing of Israel by the American foreign policy apparatus in what has been characterized as a “special relationship” between the two nations.[23] Significant portions of the U.S.-Israeli relationship have centered on security assistance. Examples include a $10 billion military MOU from 2006-2016, $3.3 billion in annual military financing, several cooperative missile programs, and an additional $1 billion in supplemental funding in 2022.[24] Israel’s access and reliance on U.S. security assistance have contributed to their regional military and intelligence supremacy.

Israeli military, intelligence, and technological superiority in the region was a fact before the October 7th attack.[25] Israeli pursuit and integration of technology across the security environment was partly facilitated through the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, better known as the Mossad.[26] Liberatad Ventures,  Mossad’s Technological Innovation Fund, has effectively sought and integrated relevant technology into Israeli military intelligence (Aman), Shabak (Shin bet), and other security structures.[27] The preponderance of technological capabilities reinforced general perceptions of Israeli invincibility and dominance. Opinions on Israeli regional military and intelligence domination were further extended through popular culture among domestic and foreign audiences. For instance, the 1986 film Sword of Gideon and the 2005 film Munich provide adaptations of Israel’s hunt for the perpetrators of the Munich massacre, celebrating Israeli superiority and perseverance.[28]

Few security professionals thought the Oct.7th attacks were possible in light of Israel’s demonstrated capabilities, which had become cemented in the social psyche through an ongoing in-group narrative and which reinforced an image of security superiority and invincibility.[29] The support of the United States, the technological infusion and capacity, and the demonstrated intelligence and military capabilities of Israel gave analysts as well as Israeli citizens an inaccurate perception that the terrorist threat from Gaza was more controlled than it turned out to be.[30]  The military, intelligence, and technological advancements Israel enjoyed contributed to the “mow the grass” attitude adopted as policy, which further contributed to Israel’s security complacency.[31]

Mowing the grass in a ‘start-up’ nation

Israel used a strategy of defensive barriers coupled with the sporadic use of military force to reduce Palestinian terrorist attacks. The Israeli doctrine of “mowing the grass” conveys, simply, that whenever terrorists were able to overcome the physical and technological barriers separating Gaza from Israel and attacked, Israel would respond to those attacks with military force—often in the form of an airstrike.[32]  The 245-mile ‘security barrier’ creates a physical obstacle to entering Israel while also facilitating technological surveillance of civilian Palestinians, Hamas, and other Israeli enemies near the Gaza border.[33]  At the same time, the physical and technological barrier contributed to Israel’s mistaken perception of safety from Palestinians through the construction of a containment and barrier system.[34] While the security was never believed to be absolute, pedestrian and vehicle-borne  Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks were significantly reduced after the interlocking physical and technical barriers were deployed.[35] Occasional (and often inaccurate) rocket attacks fired by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) came from Gaza but were repeatedly intercepted by “several cooperative missile defense programs . . . David’s Sling and Iron Dome, as well as Arrow, Arrow II, and Arrow III.”[36] Levels of violence from Hamas and PIJ had been reduced to the point that, as explained by David Weinberg from the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, the Israeli government believed Hamas was “moderating” or “maturing” because of increasing governance responsibilities in Gaza.[37] Whenever attacks did  penetrate the physical and technological barriers, Israel’s response was to “mow the grass.”

The described challenge-response cycle known as “mowing the grass” typified the Israeli approach to Hamas violence for many years.[38] Israeli responses to terrorist attacks repeatedly resulted in significant death and destruction in Gaza, consistently leading to debates on proportionality in the use of force.[39] The policy was not without challenges and detractors. For instance, in 2014 “mowing the grass” was criticized for failing to stop attacks, for creating new militants, and for a high number of Palestinian civilian casualties.[40] Gaza is densely populated, which makes it difficult to target specific individuals—especially without exposing Israeli Defense Forces to heightened danger.[41] Although the policy had critics both within Israel and internationally, it was the de facto reality in the context of Israel’s management of and response to attacks emanating from Gaza.

To be unequivocal, the Israeli policy of “mowing the grass” ended with the October 7th attacks. Israel’s stated policy now is the destruction of Hamas.[42] Many have questioned whether that is possible.[43] But more than three months into the declared war, the Israeli military continues to pursue that goal. As reported on the 100th day of the Gaza War, “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed yesterday that Israel will pursue “total victory” and that “no one will stop us, not The Hague, not the Axis of Evil and not anyone else.”[44]

Internal and regional political context

The escalation of Hamas’ violence on October 7th relates directly to the political context perceived by both Israelis and Palestinians. It is important because it enables an understanding of the violence on a basis of rational action rather than being restricted to a discourse of moral opprobrium.  It is crucial to identify terrorism as political violence (rather than merely as violence absent a political nexus), and this necessarily situates our analysis within political frames held by the various sides.[45] There is no need for an analyst to adopt an amoral vantage point, but a concentration on rationality, communication, and political focus ultimately renders more analytical ‘juice for the squeeze’ than moral argumentation alone. In this section, I consider the political distractions and concerns of both the Israeli public at large and the Israeli political leadership. I argue that a shifting regional political context contributed to a perceived sense of urgency on the part of Hamas leadership to change the status quo and that it ultimately facilitated the significantly amplified use of violence by Hamas, which culminated in the October 7th attack.

Internal Israeli polarization and distraction.

In July 2023, the Likud-led government of Israel announced and began pushing a plan to alter Israeli Supreme Court decision-making capabilities. The judicial overhaul was intended to reduce the ability of the Court to overrule laws passed by the government that the court determined (through legal process) to be “unreasonable” and therefore unconstitutional.[46] This represented a substantial and destabilizing change to the balance of power among the arms of the Israeli government and was characterized by some as an attack by the executive upon the judiciary. The proposal was highly contentious. AP News described the unrest, protests, and public polarization as “one of the biggest domestic crises in Israeli history.”[47] The attempted changes to the judicial system created social unrest across Israel and polarized Jewish communities abroad.

It is important to consider the background of this atmosphere of instability. Benjamin Netanyahu had been indicted on corruption charges in November 2019.[48] Nothing in Israeli law requires anyone indicted on corruption charges to vacate public office. Having been indicted but still remaining politically active, Netanyahu was again made Prime Minister in 2022.[49] As of this writing, Netanyahu has served an unprecedented six times as Prime Minister, with a total of 17 years in office.[50] While legally allowed his return to office polarized the Israeli public. The cases against Netanyahu involved allegations of bribery, fraud, and breach of public trust.[51] While unproven, political opponents suggested that Netanyahu was proposing changes to the Supreme Court’s authorities at least partly because of perceived advantages it might afford him in his criminal cases.[52] At the same time, the influential religious Right fundamentally rejects the secular court, further exacerbating the situation and pointing to the nuance within the Israeli political landscape.[53]

The public held demonstrations and disrupted roads and services to protest the proposed judicial overhaul. That portion of the country, counter to the Likud political party in general and counter to Netanyahu’s leadership in particular, concentrated their discourse on the criminal charges and the lack of speed with which the trial was proceeding. Throughout Israel, disruption and public attention were on domestic legal issues. I argue that this polarized a portion of the population, contributed to the distraction, and turned the focus of policymakers and much of the public away from the security situation. At the same time, Israeli security concerns were focused on Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, not the perceived relative backwater of Gaza and Hamas.

A month after the attack, “Only 18% of Israelis wanted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to continue in his role…”[54] Never one to give in to public pressure, Netanyahu remains the Prime Minister more than three months after the attack. Despite the ongoing war in Gaza, Netanyahu’s corruption trial resumed on December 11, 2023, returning some focus to the indictments.[55]

Political perceptions from regional normalization of relations with Israel

At the same time Israel was dealing with internal political disruptions, international progress related to the normalization of regional relations between Israel and some Arab states was seen as potentially problematic for Palestinians. A possible budding normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel was perceived to be the most dangerous to the Palestinian cause of statehood. Many believed that regional normalization of relations with Israel would kill any Palestinian chance for a two-state solution.

While Israeli security confidence was high and attention was diverted to internal Israeli political strife, progress toward  normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia continued to advance.[56] Egypt normalized relations with Israel in 1980, and Jordan followed suit by normalizing relations with Israel in 1994.[57] These relationships have not been without challenges, and the current war has stressed those relationships further.[58] Egypt has warned both the U.S. and Israel about its concern related to a mass migration of Palestinian refugees fleeing the Israeli military action in Gaza.[59] Both the Jordanian population and government are demanding a cease-fire from the Israeli military’s response in Gaza.[60]

Despite Palestinian angst caused by these earlier treaties and the resulting engagement with Israel, the possible rapprochementwith Saudi Arabia was perceived by Palestinians as particularly damaging in the event a Saudi-Israeli realignment occurred before Palestinian statehood was realized.[61] Saudi Arabia’s important regional position derives from its large oil reserves and ongoing relationship with the U.S. In September 2023, just before the attacks occurred, confidence was high that the Saudi-Israeli deal would go forward.[62] The timing of the attacks, then, was either a bonus in waylaying the agreement or possibly a targeted goal in stopping the agreement before it was completed. But just over a month after the attacks, many commentators were suggesting the potential deal was dead.[63] Disregarding desperate pleas from the U.S.’s  Biden Administration, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) backed away from the rapprochement. He had adequately rehabilitated his public image following the 2018 Khashoggi murder and felt at liberty to rebuff U.S. leadership.[64] MBS’s improved public persona allowed him to snub Biden’s request for more oil while placating the Saudi streets by expressing his support of Palestinians in Gaza.[65]

Driving Hamas escalation and greater violence

I have discussed some of the contextual elements that attended the radical shift in violence levels used by Hamas. I now turn to the heart of that escalation and consider how and why observable group dynamics facilitated Hamas’ escalation and what these more violent tactics mean going forward for decision-makers in the political violence security arena. Two Hamas leaders emerged at this contextually-critical period to lead the terrorist group (which had once been religiously organized but ethno-nationalist in focus) into an all-out war with the regional military hegemon, Israel.  These men are Mohammed al-Deif (a.k.a. “the guest”) and Yahya Sinwar.

Same goals, different ideological structures

One of the important ‘truths’ that terrorism studies research has given the analyst is that terrorist  groups form and act partly because of some perceived relative deprivation between an identifiable in-group and out-group.[66] Following the failure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to secure a Palestinian state, and in the context of the decline of Leftist agendas and support structures more generally (i.e., the end of Soviet global power and influence), Hamas emerged to formulate an ethno-nationalist agenda within a culturally relevant religious framework.[67] The prior goal of post-colonial independent Palestinian rule was retained, but the organizing structures and support were no longer Marxist. Instead, the organizing structures and support were now found in a local extension of the Muslim Brotherhood.[68] While these ideological support structures changed, the Palestinian people’s ultimate goal (initially identified through perceptions of relative deprivation) remained the same: they wanted a Palestinian state. In this religious formation, they were even more at liberty to escalate their violence, given that the out-group vilification could be portrayed in eschatological and cosmic terms.[69] The out-group was not just “othered” by man—they were set apart by God.

To understand how Hamas—a Sunni Islamic religious structure—can replace an atheistic Marxist ideology while also continuing to pursue the same goal (a Palestinian state), we again turn to Hoffman’s research. During the same period Hamas was forming and carrying out its early attacks, Hoffman recognized a transition taking place in terrorism more generally: an increase in religious (rather than secular) structures for terrorist group ideology.[70] The shift from Leftist and secular to religious structures easily facilitated a dynamic evolution and escalation of violence.[71] Divine and eschatological understandings of patronage for the in-group, coupled with theological rather than secular in-group narrative and boundaries, effectively delineate the terrorist group’s goals.[72] At the same time, Hamas’ efforts to communicate their political messages through acts of violence grew more difficult in a world evermore inured to vicious and bloody attacks.[73] But the ability to appeal to God for justification through greater violence is legitimized by the in-group through portraying the out-group, Israelis and Jews more generally, as enemies of God, not just a temporal enemy.[74] Hamas in-group leadership escalated their viciousness and higher body counts in an effort to continue using terrorism to convey the group’s political message.

Hamas is a learning organization and is focused on more than Israel alone

Terrorist organizations are learning organizations.[75] The recognition that they are learning organizations is directly relevant to understanding why Hamas escalated their level of violence with the October 7,2023 attack. Recognizing terrorist groups as learning organizations can be a disturbing realization for counterterrorist efforts, but essential to recognize if states expect to be effective in countering terrorism. Terrorist groups are primarily clandestine; they are targeted by out-group nations and rival subnational groups while possessing limited “terrorist” capital from which to draw. Wasted or ineffective action often leads to group destruction.[76] Because these groups have limited resources and are pursued and targeted by various out-groups, the actions of groups like Hamas must have a perceived positive in-group impact in order to maintain group cohesion and effectiveness.[77]

As analysts of terrorism, we become fixated on the out-group violence that impacts us or our allies. However, the complex intergroup dynamics are important to understanding extreme violence escalation. For instance, how should we understand Hamas’s targeting and killing members of another Sunni Islamist terrorist organization, and what does that escalation of violence illuminate more generally? Consider the interaction between Hamas and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Sunni group, Jund Ansar Allah, which established a mosque and social presence in Gaza.[78] The interaction and violence do not target the ultimate out-group, Israel, and from a distance, might be seen as Hamas killing-off supporters or fellow travelers of the same ideology. But nuance and distinction are key. In this case, the message communicated through violence is that although Hamas is clearly a Sunni Islamist terrorist group, they were distinct from the al- Qaeda Salafi affiliate and considered Jund Ansar Allah an out-group to be killed.[79] The two groups’ ultimate goals are slightly different from each other: Hamas seeking Palestinian statehood, and Jund Ansar Allah was pursuing the al-Qaeda goal of a global Caliphate.

The violence used to target Jund Ansar Allah, the message sent to potential supporters of the group, and the capital expended to carry out the attack were seen in a positive light by Hamas leadership. The positive perception is in part because the attack killing the al-Qaeda-affiliated Salafists crystallized the in-group narrative between the two distinct factions. Unlike many distant Western out-groups, the Palestinians in Gaza publicly evaluated the violence and understood the social message: Hamas’s focus on a Palestinian homeland organized under Sunni Islamism was not the same as an al-Qaeda-inspired Califate.[80] Hamas was sending a message that al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates would not be tolerated in Gaza. The same level of effective communication could not be said of attacks by Hamas in the “mow the grass” era of the challenge and response cycle which led to the October 7th attack. Thus, as an organization, Hamas learns to increase its violence levels to achieve and communicate its political goals, as it is internally rather than externally evaluated.

Communicating political messages through violence in a desensitized world

Terrorist groups are not only learning organizations but, as Crenshaw and others argue, they are also calculating rational actors who  may perceive a change when the level of violence previously used is no longer effectively communicating their political message.[81] The violence used by Hamas against Israel became contained mainly by Israel’s physical and technological separation barrier.[82] For Israel, the reduction in effective political communication from Hamas (i.e., ‘attacks’) contributed to its  decade-plus-long use of the “mowing the grass” policy. In addition to public perceptions of Israeli intelligence and military hegemony, the policy was in part facilitated by the public’s desensitization to Hamas terrorist violence.[83]

We have asked why Hamas radically escalated their violence profile from what they had carried out previously and why they escalated at this point in history. A multifaceted answer to why to escalate (and why at this time) begins to emerge. The contextual issues suggest that Israeli attention was focused on internal politics. At the same time, Israel’s attention was focused elsewhere; Hamas’ leadership was concerned that the geopolitical possibilities for Palestinian statehood were diminishing. Israeli perceptions of relative safety from the Hamas attack were popularly supported by a widespread belief in a physical and technological safety cordon. In the context of these supporting reasons for the escalation, the escalation itself was necessarily facilitated by the crucial element of concurrent and effective terrorist group political and military leadership.

Specific leaders at this contextual juncture

Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed al-Masri (al-Deif) filled two important roles for Hamas at this key inflection point. Sinwar was the charismatic strategic political leader of Hamas in Gaza.[84] Mohammed al-Deif drove much of the military capability of Hamas as the leader of Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigades.[85] Both men were nearly 60 years old (which the analyst should recognize as elderly given that both men lived in Gaza and were professional terrorists) and were being hunted by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) until their deaths.[86] Each man was involved with Hamas nearly since it was founded. And, important for this discussion on escalation, both Sinwar and al Deif had résumés that read like they were each a poster child for perceptions of personal “relative deprivation.”[87]

Al-Deif had been targeted repeatedly—perhaps as many as seven times—by the IDF before the October 7th attacks. During a 2014 attempt to kill him, his wife, seven-month-old son, and three-year-old daughter were killed by an IDF airstrike.[88] After the October 7th attacks, IDF airstrikes continued to target al-Deif, eventually killing him in a July 2024 airstrike in Gaza.[89] Al-Deif was the picture of a man committed to the cause and was known to both his in-group and out-group. He had deep personal animus towards Israel, proven technical capability to attack, and is likely to remain an inspiration to his in-group even in death.

Yahya al-Sinwar was akin to al-Deif in length of commitment to the in-group and was widely recognized as the internal face of Hamas’ strategic leadership in Gaza. Sinwar spent 22 years in an Israeli prison where he learned to speak fluent Hebrew.[90] On the day after the attack, he demonstrated this fluency in a Gaza tunnel to some October 7th hostages taken from the Nir Oz Kibbutz.[91] Sinwar had been imprisoned for kidnapping and killing Israeli IDF soldiers, but he was released from custody as part of a 2011 hostage exchange of more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners given for kidnapped IDF sergeant Gilad Shalit. [92] Sinwar was killed by the IDF on October 17, 2024.[93]

The influence of Sinwar and al-Deif are important elements related to the escalation of Hamas violence. Each of these leaders had a long and proven track record of commitment to the organization. They were positioned to influence whether Hamas escalated their violence at this time to communicate their political message. Each man not only had the collective perception of relative deprivation but also, quite clearly, strong personal animus and perceptions of relative deprivation towards Israel. Also important at the personal level is a consideration of the relatively advanced age of both men, given their location (Gaza) and their chosen occupation as terrorists. While there is no way to be certain, it is possible that all of the previously described political and social contextual elements around the Israel-Gaza question might have evolved and become manifest without any significant escalation of violence if only these two specific men had not been in their particular positions of power, leadership, and influence within the Hamas organization.

Remembering some terrorism studies fundamentals

The escalation of terrorist violence by Hamas against civilian and military targets caught Israeli and Western intelligence structures by surprise.[94] The violence was shocking, vicious, and hideous. It targeted many non-combatants, including babies and the elderly, able-bodied and infirm civilians, women (some of whom were sexually brutalized), and families who were forced to watch their loved ones be gruesomely murdered. The extreme violence shocked and revulsed the world, and the public outcry following the attack—indeed across the globe—has been deafening. Terrorism is immoral and evil, but to reduce its impact, we need informed analysis.

Discussion

How much worse can terrorism get?

Terrorism can always get worse.  History has shown that terrorist tactics are “dynamic, amorphous, and evolving.”[95] Terrorist groups are learning organizations that are keen observers of both their in-group capabilities and their constantly changing environment. These clandestine groups do not want to expend “terrorist capital” without achieving their goal of communicating their political message. When they perceive that their message is no longer being communicated, they change their methods, often increasing their violence and barbarity to regain the public’s attention. We know this to be true because we can look at history and identify where groups have previously made the tactical violence leap.

Tactical innovation and violence escalation have been the hallmark of several terrorist organizations. For instance, the Irgun internationalized and synchronized attacks while seriously escalating the number killed in a single bombing to 91 souls.[96] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked three aircraft and took them to Dawson’s Field in Jordan, where the passengers were removed, and the planes were blown up for all the world to see, communicating the group’s message in new ways.[97] Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers), became enamored with Hezbollah suicide truck bombings and applied serious research and development within his organization to produce a pedestrian suicide vest more appropriate to the LTTE area of operation.[98] The world considered both groups outrageously immoral in their innovative escalation, but the strategic and tactical effectiveness of  these groups is difficult to deny. The LTTE killed two heads of state with the tactic.[99] Al-Qaeda’s innovation and escalation built on previous hijackings coupled with the integration of suicide terrorism to create flying fuel-air bombs with which they targeted the Twin Towers and Pentagon, killing 2997 on Sep. 11, 2001.[100]

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and the permutations that evolved thereafter—including Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq, and Ash Sham (ISIS)—eventually became the Islamic State and exceeded all the contemporaneously-known boundaries innovating and escalating violence in pursuit of effective terrorist messaging.[101] The Islamic State did this in many ways; for instance, they adopted GoPro cameras and professional film editing to produce recruitment videos featuring vicious decapitations, drownings, immolations, and other shocking methods of killing while capturing their viciousness.[102] In short, the Islamic State completely changed the public’s perception of terrorist savagery.

What does it mean going forward?

Gathering idiosyncratic factoids about the groups, victims, perpetrators, or respondents to the attack does not move us forward much. Moral outrage is a human emotion but not a framework for serious analysis. In-group narratives support that group’s presuppositional position but always betray a socially constructed reality.[103]

Analysis: Terrorism is dynamic, amorphous and evolving[104]

Each time terrorist groups escalate violence levels to communicate their political message, we are shocked in horror. On the one hand, it is good because it means that, in a terribly violent world foisted on the public through media and social media, perhaps we can still be surprised and revulsed by horrendous political violence. On the other hand, terrorism specialists and security leaders should not be taken by surprise when terrorist groups learn from their environment and adjust their tactics. The historical evidence is clear that when terrorist group leadership no longer perceives it is effectively communicating the group’s political message or goal through status quo violence, a tactical change will follow in an attempt to make the target audience ‘hear’ them.

The Hamas attack makes clear that analysis is dynamic, just as the nations, groups, and surrounding environments are dynamic. Analysis—even good analysis—is only relevant in relation to the evolving situation and context. Every situation is evolving, and each group of people contributes to that—whether at the national or subnational group level. Some groups evolve away from using violence to convey their message; for example, we can recall the Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), where their perceived relative deprivation receded.[105] Others are moving in the opposite direction. For instance, in the U.S., some argue that Christian Nationalists will escalate violence levels in the short term to communicate their perceived relative deprived position.[106]

In the October 7th Hamas-Israel case, it can be argued that the escalation in violence produced the outcome Hamas desired.  Disregarding the damage and destruction of infrastructure in Gaza, which, for their purposes, Hamas might consider incidental, the increased violence by Hamas amplified the message of a desired Palestinian state. Indeed, that violent communication has resonated in many corners of the globe. We can see that this is accurate through the media and public attention to the event and the public outcry and demonstrations associated with it around the world.[107]  Consider that public displays of support for a Palestinian state have reemerged in force following the attack.[108] The focus has not been only on the killing of innocents in Israel, but emphasis was also translated by some to focus on the perceived relative deprivation Hamas sought to highlight. Before the attack, the Palestinian homeland issue was not a common public discussion in the West. Following the attacks, the airwaves and streets were full of protests and counter-protests  about the same event (i.e., debates about the justification and proportionality of the attack by Hamas and the response by Israel) and associated issues.[109] In effect, Hamas escalation and increased violence facilitated the terror group’s political communication.

Escalating violence to levels that force public reception of terror group communication is not straightforward. Hamas leadership recognized the fading failure of their previous less violent attacks. They also had to facilitate and manage an ongoing patron/client relationship with Iran to provide necessary weapons and materiel.  Hamas had to exploit internal Israeli politics as well as accurately judge the Palestinian political situation—both globally and regionally. And Hamas’ internal leadership had to time and operationalize the attack in a way that gave them a perceived advantage. Recognizing what Hamas did to carry out the attack does not justify or validate violence against non-combatants. However, failing to acknowledge the terrorist  group’s effectiveness in this case would extend vulnerabilities that lead to further deaths.

Israeli regional hegemony is challenged by Iran. Iranian patronage to Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthi in Yemen each represent a front in a larger, more dangerous regional competition. Actions like the assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut, Lebanon, on January 2, 2024, further illustrate the likelihood of  growing regional conflict as part of the broader struggle for regional hegemony.[110] South Beirut, traditionally a Hezbollah stronghold, is also in a patron/client relationship with Iran.[111] The ongoing challenge and response cycle demands an increased response from Hezbollah against Israel.[112] Tamping down the local challenges will partially answer the disturbance, but as global order is disrupted, BRICS and the Global South suggest different answers and resolutions than the U.S.—answers that  increasingly resonate with enemies of the U.S. and the West.[113]

Brittle security structures leave the creators and maintainers of that structure vulnerable to fracture and potential security catastrophe. The picture of a brittle security structure fracturing was on display throughout the Arab Spring.[114] As Anders Strindberg has noted, what starts with a greengrocer setting himself on fire in Tunisia spreads to regional unrest and civil war in Egypt and Syria.[115] The policy of mowing the grass points to a brittle security environment, which is likely to continue to fracture and threaten the Israeli population. The fracture of this local issue is, of course, a possible (and, perhaps, likely) catalyst for sustained regional conflict. The October 7th Hamas attack should be considered as a role being played out in a larger drama and struggle for regional hegemony between Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.[116]

Hamas has traditionally focused its violence on Israel. But analysts should also consider what the October 7th attacks mean for the United States.  The ‘good news’ is that the goal of a Palestinian state is quite different from those of takfiri Salafi Jihadists, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.[117] While Hamas has made a major escalation that must be understood as religious terrorism focused on the creation of a Palestinian state, their theologically situated understanding is distinct from Salafists. We see that distinction in both the conflict with Jund Ansar Allah in Gaza and the conflict between al-Qaeda and Hamas, as illustrated through Osama bin Laden’s  statements and Ayman Zawahiri’s letters rebuking engagement in electoral politics.[118] However, the ‘bad news’ is that Hamas need not become Salafi to threaten the U.S. Israel and the U.S. are perceived to be in a patron/client relationship along the same lines as that which exists between Iran and its proxies.[119] Given the escalation and expanding conflict zone, the U.S. should prepare for attacks against American interests from Hamas supporters acting on their perceptions of the conflict. It remains to be seen if the expanding conflict will prompt Hamas-directed attacks against U.S.  interests based on the U.S.’s continued support of Israeli actions in Gaza.

One final analytical observation should be considered: the potential impact that narrative warfare will likely have beyond any kinetic violence from either Hamas or Israel.  Hamas cannot kill their way into a state. Israel cannot kill their way out of conflict with Palestinians. What can happen is that the dominant narrative will partially determine what happens next. The U.S. was never militarily defeated in Vietnam, but narrative warfare made it impossible for the U.S. to stay.  This was influenced by the media showing three images that argued against continued U.S. engagement. The first picture is South Vietnamese General Loan shooting Vietcong prisoner Nguyen Can Lem in the head while handcuffed; the execution was captured on film by NBC News crews.[120] The second is a photo of 14-year-old Mary Ann Vecchio kneeling over the body of a dead Kent State student protester shot by National Guard soldiers.[121] The third is a picture of nine-year-old  Kim Phúc, running naked while screaming and crying in a Vietnamese street after being burned with napalm.[122] While technology has evolved since the Vietnam War, narrative warfare remains the same. In that war with respect to Gaza, there is only one ‘primary front:’ social media.

Conclusions

Escalations in terrorist violence should not surprise terrorism studies scholars or security-focused practitioners and decision makers. This is especially true when it is believed or accepted that the out-group threat is complacent, controlled, or contained. This is particularly true in extended conflicts where status quo levels of violence no longer garner the impact desired to communicate the terrorist message. Adaptation and escalation are part of the ongoing challenge and response cycle between states and terrorists.

Terrorist groups are rational learning organizations that constantly adapt to their dynamic environments. They do so while accounting for internal and external events concerning in-group perceptions of relative deprivation and their collective group goals. The terrorist in-group narrative will always support and justify in-group actions in much the same way states justify their actions to their populations. The facts about reality are the same for both groups, but each group’s socially constructed perceptions about that shared reality are different. No evaluation of a timeline ‘proving’ causality for the conflict will change the outgroup’s mind.

Patron-client relationships matter for both state and non-state actors. Weapons acquisition and resupply, providing intelligence, in-group logistical concerns, secondary fronts, and narrative support are the dominant contributions of patrons. This is true of sub-state relations with states in much the same way it is true for patron-client relations between nation states.

Sometimes, the perceived war is also a localized echo of a much larger contest for regional hegemony. Crushing local challenges in a brittle security environment may lead to greater regional or global conflict and instability. This is particularly true during a transitional phase in the prevailing global order. Understanding the direction and speed at which the transition is taking place is a part of determining success. Ultimately, the most important aspect of the Hamas-Israel escalation may be its growing impact on the narrative war rather than the way it plays out kinetically on the battlefield in Gaza and Israel.

About the Author

David W. Brannan, PhD, is Senior Faculty with the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, and Vice President for Strategy with The Hoffman Group, which provides government and private industry with counter-terrorism analytical and educational support. Brannan is committed to family, cattle, horses, motorcycles, BBQ, and his students.

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Tessier, Yann. “Hundreds of Thousands Rally Across Cities to Support Palestinians.” Reuters. October 28, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/thousands-join-pro-palestinian-protest-london-demand-gaza-ceasefire-2023-10-28/.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “The Humanitarian Impact of 20 Years of the Barrier—2022.” December 30, 2022. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-impact-20-years-barrier-december-2022.

United States Department of State. U.S. Relations with Israel: Fact Sheet. January 30, 2023. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-israel-2/#:~:text=The%2075%2Dyear%20partnership%20has,economic%20prosperity%2C%20and%20regional%20security.

United States Institute of Peace. “Saudi-Israel Normalization Agreement: Horizon.” September 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/09/saudi-israel-normalization-agreement-horizon.

University of Maryland. “Do 90 Percent of Terrorist Groups Last Less Than a Year? Updating the Conventional Wisdom.” START Global Terrorism Database.  https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/do-90-percent-terrorist-groups-last-less-year-updating-conventional-wisdom.

———. START Global Terrorism Database. http://apps.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Vidal, Marta. “Jordan’s Teetering Balancing Act.” Foreign Policy. November 30, 2023. Accessed August 1, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/30/jordan-protests-palestinians-gaza-israel-bombardment-war/.

Walter, Barbara F. How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them. Crown, 2022.

Ward, Joe. “Clientelism and Proxy Conflict: The Dangers That Lie Ahead for a Weakened Lebanese State.” Institute for Peace and Security Studies, October 24, 2021. https://jasoninstitute.com/clientelism-and-proxy-conflict-the-dangers-that-lie-ahead-for-a-weakened-lebanese-state/.

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Zegart, Amy. “Israel’s Intelligence Disaster.” Foreign Affairs. October 11, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/israels-intelligence-disaster.

Zwingenberg, Ohad. “Protests Against Israel’s Judicial Overhaul Kick Off at Supreme Court a Day Before Crucial Hearing.” AP World News. September 11, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/israel-politics-justice-minister-judicial-overhaul-netanyahu-b93481650524a63c4e85199c0ea3fb4d.

Notes

[1] See Abdulaziz Sager, “The Palestinian Issue Cannot Be Sidelined Any Longer,” Council of Councils, October 12, 2023.

[2] “Maps and Videos Show How the Deadly Surprise Attack on Israel Unfolded,” The Washington Post, October 8, 2023.

[3] Rhea Mogul et al., “October 15, 2023 Israel-Hamas War News,” CNN World, October 16, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-news-hamas-war-10-15-23/h_8f8c6baac599c49c442ad4745ef42441. Also see, Summer Said and Anat Peled, “Hamas Took More Than 200 Hostages From Israel. Here’s What We Know,” The Wall Street Journal, updated January 9, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-hostages-israel-gaza-41432124

[4] Amy Zegart, “Israel’s Intelligence Disaster,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/israels-intelligence-disaster.

[5] Y. Katz, “Technology and Innovation in Israel: Advancing Competitive Position in a Global Environment,” Open Journal of Political Science 8 (2018): 536-546, doi:10.4236/ojps.2018.84033.

[6] Haleigh Bartos and John Chin, “What Went Wrong? Three Hypotheses on Israel’s Massive Intelligence Failure,” Modern War Institute, October 31, 2023, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-went-wrong-three-hypotheses-on-israels-massive-intelligence-failure/.

[7] Salih Bıçakcı and Hazal Muslu El Berni, “Rapprochement in Israel-Saudi Foreign Policy: Moving on Tiptoes to a Normalization Process?” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 16, no. 3 (2022): 327-341, doi:10.1080/25765949.2022.2147327. Also see, Simon, Steven, “The Hamas Leader Overestimated Israel’s Fractures, and Underestimated Netanyahu’s Willingness to Destroy Gaza,” Analysis | Middle East. October 17, 2024, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/sinwar-death/ for a description of how Sinwar may have believed the October 7th attack would bring about an internal collapse to the state of Israel.

[8] Bruce Hoffman’s 48-year history of work on terrorism has repeatedly called analysts back to the essential element of political communication as a foundational element of terrorist violence. This clarion call not to lose sight of “why” terrorists use violence to communicate their message is found across the substantial body of his work. For instance, see, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 43 and 206.

[9] For an explanation of the SIAM framework, see, David W. Brannan and Anders Strindberg, “The Social Identity Analytical Method: Facilitating Social Science-Based Practitioner Analysis of Violent Substate Conflict,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2023), doi:10.1080/1057610X.2023.2256538.

[10] See Philip Mudd, The Head Game: High-Efficiency Analytic Decision Making and the Art of Solving Complex Problems Quickly (New York & London: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2015), chap. 1.

[11] The author is aware that Hamas did not act alone in the October 7th attack. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) participated and is believed to be holding some prisoners. That said, the majority of the attack and media focus has been on Hamas. The PIJ is included or identified where the evidence points to their specific actions.

[12] For a detailed explanation, see David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and N. T. Anders Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1 (2001): 3-24, doi:10.1080/10576100118602.

[13] Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 43 and 206.

[14] For one of the most insightful emotional descriptions of the Oct 7 attacks, Peggy Noonan, “A Look Back at ’23 and Me,” Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-look-back-at-23-and-me-politics-end-of-year-america-0e0d4c0b?mod=panda_wsj_author_alert

[15] Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 43 and 206. This terrorism studies essential element is supported throughout the influential work of Martha Crenshaw. See, Crenshaw, Martha, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 379–99, https://doi.org/10.2307/421717.

[16] Avoiding the “timeline” focus of proving who started the conflict is an important element of this approach. The goal is not to become embroiled in hermeneutic feedback loops, but to provide an advantage for decision makers in the security arena. For an explanation of the impact of the hermeneutic feedback loop on analysis, see, Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, ”Talking to Terrorists,”  3–24.

[17] Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991, University of Nebraska Press, 2002. On the Six-Day War see, Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2002), and, Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War (Schocken Books, 2005) on the Yom Kippur War. Also see, Kreps, Sarah E. “The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned.” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 37, no. 1 (Spring 2007): Article 7, for interesting lessons learned related to the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict.

[18] For insights on Israel’s deterrence perceptions and intelligence hubris, see, Uri Bar-Joseph and Avner Cohen, “How Israel’s Spies Failed—and Why Escalation Could Be Catastrophic,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/19/israel-intelligence-gaza-nuclear-weapons-hezbollah-iran-escalation-could-be-catastrophic/. For a recent handling of the 1972 massacre, as viewed by the Israeli press, see, Tal Laor, “Framing the Munich Olympics Massacre in the Israeli Press,” Israel Affairs 28, no. 4 (2022): 597–609, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2022.2088125. Also see, Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (Warner, 1991).

[19] Gil Merom, “Israel’s National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 3 (1999): 409–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/2658204.

[20] For an explanation of how Israel’s military superiority gave birth to international terrorism, see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 65-82 and, Daniel Byman, “The 1967 War and the Birth of International Terrorism,” Lawfare May 30, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/1967-war-and-birth-international-terrorism.

[21] See Katz, “Technology and Innovation in Israel,” 536-546.

[22] Early arguments for Israel’s aspiring hegemony can be found in, Zachary T. Irwin, “Israel: An Aspiring Hegemon,” in Regional Hegemons: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Response, ed. David J. Meyers (New York: Routledge, 1991), 63-96. Or more recently in popular literature, Ceyhun Cicekci, “Israel: A Regional Hegemon?” The Times of Israel, October 24, 2017, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/israel-a-regional-hegemon-2/.

[23] For a detailed explanation of the unambiguous and continued commitment of the United States to Israel’s political and military hegemony in the region, see, Jim Garamone, “DOD Officials Detail Department’s Goals in Middle East,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 24, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3566752/dod-officials-detail-departments-goals-in-middle-east/.

[24] See, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Israel: Fact Sheet,” January 30, 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-israel2/#:~:text=The%2075%2Dyear%20partnership%20has,economic%20prosperity%2C%20and%20regional%20security.

[25] See, Gareth Jennings and Yaakov Lappin, “Israel to Deploy Protective ‘Laser Wall,’” Janes, February 4, 2022, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/israel-to-deploy-protective-laser-wall for an explanation of the intersection between technology, intelligence and military capability.

[26] Amir Cahane, Who Will Watch the Watchmen? Oversight of Online Surveillance in Israel (September 18, 2020). Paper Series “Rethinking Privacy and Mass Surveillance in the Information Age,” Israel Public Policy Institute and Heinrich Böll Foundation, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3819815.

[27] Libertad Ventures, https://libertad.gov.il. Also see, Shabak, https://www.shabak.gov.il/en/terror/ for information on “Shaback’s” role in the Israeli intelligence community.

[28] Sword of Gideon, directed by Michael Anderson (1986), https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0092038/, and Munich, directed by Steven Spielberg (2005), https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0408306/.

[29] For an explanation of how Israel’s military superiority gave birth to international terrorism, see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 65–82 and, Byman, “The 1967 War and the Birth of International Terrorism.”

[30]This was exacerbated by the Israeli perception that this enemy operated rationally in the same manner states are deterred. Few believed Hamas would risk their control over Gaza to try and invade Israel in what clearly would not be able to destroy Israel, through the military action alone.

[31] “Hamas’ October 7 Attack: The Tactics, Targets, and Strategy of Terrorists,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 7, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamas-october-7-attack-tactics-targets-and-strategy-terrorists.  

[32] For instance, this 2021 Washington Post article explains the Israeli government’s approach is detail, see, Adam Taylor, “With Strikes Targeting Rockets and Tunnels, the Israeli Tactic of ‘Mowing the Grass’ Returns to Gaza,” The Washington Post, May 14, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/05/14/israel-gaza-history/.

[33] Lazar Berman, “Why Did Israel Think a Border Fence Would Protect It from an Army of Terrorists?” Times of Israel, October 10, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-did-israel-think-a-border-fence-would-protect-it-from-an-army-of-terrorists/.

[34] Raphael S. Cohen, “The Inevitable, Ongoing Failure of Israel’s Gaza Strategy,” The RAND Blog, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/10/the-inevitable-ongoing-failure-of-israels-gaza-strategy.html.

[35] See, University of Maryland, START Global Terrorism Database, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=casualties&search=Hamas.

[36] See, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Israel: Fact Sheet.”

[37] David M. Weinberg, “Hamas’s Horrific Massacres Smash Israel’s Longtime Faulty Strategy,” Jerusalem Post, October 16, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-768112.

[38] See Taylor, “With Strikes Targeting Rockets and Tunnels.”

[39] T. X. Hammes, “Israel and the Demise of Mowing the Grass,” War on the Rocks, August 19, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/israel-and-the-demise-of-mowing-the-grass/.

[40] Hammes, “Israel and the Demise of Mowing the Grass.”

[41] Renee Rigdon and Amy O’Kruk, “Maps show the extreme population density in Gaza,” CNN World, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/maps-population-density-gaza-israel-dg/index.html

[42] “All Things Considered,” NPR Middle East, December 31, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/12/31/1222370604/is-israel-any-closer-to-reaching-its-goal-of-destroying-hamas.

[43] See for instance, Leila Fadel and Tareq Baconi, “Morning Edition,” NPR Middle East, November 20, 2023,  https://www.npr.org/2023/11/20/1214109088/israels-plan-to-eradicate-hamas-is-an-impossible-goal-hamas-expert-says or, David Aliberti and Daniel Byman, “What Does Destroying Hamas Mean?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 15, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-destroying-hamas-mean for an informed and articulate explanation of what it mean to destroy Hamas.

[44] “What We Know,” NBC News, January 14, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-rcna133848.

[45] Hoffman is convincing at showing how the violence used by the Jewish terrorist group, Irgun was directly related to the group’s political goal of contributing to the effort of creating a Jewish homeland.  The political goal of the in-group, rather than simply an ethnic or religious distinction from the out-group is essential to determining the terroristic rather than criminal or mental illness-based violence being used. For an in-depth analysis and explanation see, Bruce Hoffman, Anonymous Soldiers, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015)

[46] Ohad Zwingenberg, “Protests against Israel’s judicial overhaul kick off at Supreme Court a day before crucial hearing,” AP World News, September 11, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/israel-politics-justice-minister-judicial-overhaul-netanyahu-b93481650524a63c4e85199c0ea3fb4d.

[47] Zwingenberg, “Protests Against Israel’s Judicial Overhaul.” It should be noted that the

Israeli Supreme Court ultimately overturned the Netanyahu government effort, January 1, 2024. See, Shaimaa Khalil and Ali Abbas Ahmadi, “Israeli Supreme Court Strikes Down Judicial Reforms,” BBC News, January 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67859177.

[48] Tia Goldenberg, “What is the latest on Netanyahu’s corruption trial?” AP World News, April 26, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/israel-netanyahu-corruption-trial-courts-4e18ed8f34e65707bd47e37696da4705.

[49] Goldenberg, “What Is the Latest on Netanyahu’s Corruption Trial?”

[50] “Government and Politics,” Jewish Virtual Library: A Project of AICE, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/prime-ministers-of-israel.

[51] Saphora Smith and Paul Goldman, “Benjamin Netanyahu Indicted on Charges of Bribery, Fraud and Breach of Trust,” NBC News, November 21, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-pm-netanyahu-indicted-charges-bribery-fraud-breach-trust-n1084831.

[52] Goldenberg, “What Is the Latest on Netanyahu’s Corruption Trial?”

[53] See for instance, Jaffe, Moshe. “The Impact of Israeli Judicial Reform on Freedom of/from Religion.” Published June 2, 2023. https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2023/06/02/the-impact-of-israeli-judicial-reform/

[54] Anat Leled, “Most Israelis Want Netanyahu to Go, Poll Shows,” The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-gaza-strip-2023-11-04/card/most-israelis-want-netanyahu-to-go-poll-shows-IQsE1tgo2akBSA2syvoX.

[55]  Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “Netanyahu’s Corruption Trial Resumes Amid War,” New York Times, December 4, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/04/world/middleeast/netanyahu-corruption-trial.html.

[56] “Saudi-Israel Normalization Agreement: On the Horizon,” United States Institute of Peace, September 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/09/saudi-israel-normalization-agreement-horizon.

[57] See, Meirav Mishali-Ram and Rami Ginat, “Challenges in the Conceptualization and Implementation of Normalization: Insights from Egyptian–Israeli Relations,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 50, no. 2 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2289666 and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Jordan and the Israeli War on Gaza: Shifts in Political Discourse,” https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90930.

[58] Egypt fears a mass migration disrupting their domestic politics while as much as 50% of Jordan’s population have Palestinian roots. See, Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Jordan: Palestinians,” 2008, https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cfcc.html.

[59] Barak Ravid, “Egypt warned Israel of “a rupture” in relations if Palestinians flee to Sinai,” Axios, December 7, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/12/07/palestinian-refugees-egypt-israel-america-relations.

[60] Marta Vidal, “Jordan’s Teetering Balancing Act,” Foreign Policy, November 30, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/30/jordan-protests-palestinians-gaza-israel-bombardment-war/.

[61] Bıçakcı and El Berni, “Rapprochement in Israel-Saudi Foreign Policy,” 327–341.

[62] See, “Israel-Saudi Arabia ‘normalisation’ deal in reach, Netanyahu tells Biden,” Al Jazeera, September 20, and, “What’s happening with normalizing ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel?” Al Jazeera, September 21, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/21/whats-happening-with-normalising-ties-between-saudi-arabia-and-israel.

[63] Aziz El Yaakoubi and Parisa Hafezi, “Saudi Arabia Puts Israel Deal on Ice Amid War, Engages with Iran, Sources Say,” Reuters, October 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13/.

[64] “The Guardian View on Saudi Arabia’s Rehabilitation: Following the Money,” The Guardian, May 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/03/the-guardian-view-on-saudi-arabias-rehabilitation-following-the-money.

[65] Bradley Hope, “The Saudi-Israeli Deal Is Likely Off. MBS May Have Gotten What He Wants Anyway,” Vanity Fair, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2023/10/saudi-israeli-deal-likely-off-mbs also see, Al Jazeera Staff, “What’s Happening with Normalizing Ties Between Saudi Arabia and Israel?”

[66] Robert Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New York: Routledge, 2016), see especially 22–45. The perception by the terrorist group of a perceived “relative deprivation” point to the group’s ultimate goal, statehood. In the Social Identity Analytical Method employed in this analysis, that goal is understood as a ‘Limited Good.’ In the case of Hamas, the ultimate Limited Good is the land and formation of a Palestinian state. For a more detailed explanation see, Brannan and Strindberg, “The Social Identity Analytical Method. See also, David W. Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014).

[67] Anders Strindberg and Matts Warn, Islamism, (Polity Press, 2011), 68-92.

[68] Devorah Margolin and Matthew Levitt, “The Road to Oct 7: Hamas’ Long Game Clarified,” CTC Sentinel 16, no. 10 (October/November 2023).

[69] Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 9, 14, 35. Also see, Reza Aslan, How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror (New York: Random House, 2009), 9, 61, 97, 155, 160–64.

[70] Bruce Hoffman, “Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993), 1–14, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7834.html.

[71] Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God.

[72] Hoffman, “Holy Terror.”

[73] The rise of the Islamic State and their vicious, bloody, and religiously motivated terror and insurgent violence is an important element related to increased violence levels. For a Social Identity Theory based analysis of ISIS and the Islamic State, see, Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Ecco, 2016).

[74] Hoffman, “Holy Terror.”

[75] Brian A. Jackson, Organizational Learning and Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2004).

[76] See, University of Maryland, START Global Terrorism Database, showing that 50% of all terrorist groups last less than one year. https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/do-90-percent-terrorist-groups-last-less-year-updating-conventional-wisdom.

[77] States tend to evaluate terrorist group actions in relation to the threat they pose to the state. This ethnocentrism makes sense but may also contribute to the state misunderstanding actions taken by the group in relation to other out-groups. For instance, the 2009 targeting of Jund Ansar Allah by Hamas was focused on the control of Gaza from Salafists rather than Israel. The in-group still valued the action targeting another Sunni terrorist group and was useful in making distinctions between the Palestinian focused Hamas and the regional or global focused al-Qaeda related Salafist organization. See, “Profile: Jund Ansar Allah,” BBC News, August 19, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8203239.stm.

[78] Benedetta Beriti, “Salafi-Jihadi Activism in Gaza,” CTC Sentinel, May 2010, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/salafi-jihadi-activism-in-gaza-mapping-the-threat/.

[79] Beriti, “Salafi-Jihadi Activism in Gaza.”

[80] Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 43, 206.

[81] Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. David Rapoport (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins, 1998).

[82] “The Humanitarian Impact of 20 Years of the Barrier—2022,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, December 30, 2022, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-impact-20-years-barrier-december-2022.

[83] See for instance, Enzo Nussio, “Attitudinal and Emotional Consequences of Islamist Terrorism,” Political Psychology, December 2020, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/pops.12679#:~:text=Cognitive%20desensitization%20refers%20to%20the,related%20to%20a%20terror%20event.

[84] It is important to note that Hamas is not “run” by any single person or position. Sinwar plays an important public facing role in Hamas leadership. The length of time he has committed to the movement, his perceived effective leadership, and regional public knowledge of some of Sinwar’s efforts are part of the reason his reemergence at this time is seen as critical. See, Ivana Kottasova and David Shortell, “Who is Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader Israel has called a ‘dead man walking,’” CNN Middle East, December 8, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/07/middleeast/yahya-sinwar-profile-intl/index.html.

[85] “Extremist Leaders: Mohammed Deif,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/mohammed-deif.

[86] Kottasova and Shortell, “Who is Yahya Sinwar.”

[87] As discussed in detail above.

[88] Ben Mathis-Lilley. “Airstrike Kills Wife and Child of Hamas’ Military Commander, Rocket Designer.” Slate, August 20, 2014, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/08/hamas-commander-wife-child-killed-israel-airstrike-takes-out-top-official-s-family-members.html.

[89] “Hamas Now Accepts Israel Killed Muhammad Deif, Has Arrested 2 People, Sources Tell Paper.” The Times of Israel, November 2, 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-now-accepts-israel-killed-muhammad-deif-has-arrested-2-people-sources-tell-paper/. Also see, Samia Nakhou and Laila Bassam. “Who Is Mohammed Deif, the Hamas Commander Behind the Attack on Israel?” Reuters Middle East, October 11, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-secretive-hamas-commander-masterminded-attack-israel-2023-10-10/.

[90] “Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar ‘Met Hostages on 8 October, Promised to Release Them,’” The New Arab MENA, November 28, 2023, https://www.newarab.com/news/hamas-head-met-israeli-hostages-8-october-spoke-hebrew.  

[91] “Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar ‘Met Hostages on 8 October,’” The New Arab MENA, November 28, 2023.

[92] Brian Bushard, “Who Is Yahya Sinwar? Israeli Forces Close In On Prisoner-Turned-Hamas Leader Whose ‘Days Are Numbered,’” Forbes, December 14, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianbushard/2023/12/08/who-is-yahya-sinwar-israeli-forces-close-in-on-prisoner-turned-hamas-leader/?sh=45eb73918c99.

[93] “Statement from President Joe Biden on the Death of Yahya Sinwar,” U.S. Embassy in Israel, October 17, 2024, https://il.usembassy.gov/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-death-of-yahya-sinwar/

[94] One counter argument is that Israeli intelligence was forewarned of unusual activity by Hamas at the separation barrier between by Unit 414 of the Nahal Oz command, but were not believed by superiors. See, News Desk, “Israel Ignored Border Guard Warnings Months Before Resistance Attack,” The Cradle, October 26, 2023, https://new.thecradle.co/articles-id/11089 and, Emanuel Fabian, “’A Story of Heroism and Fighting’: Army Reopens Surveillance Center Stormed by Hamas,” The Times of Israel, November 6, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-story-of-heroism-and-fighting-army-reopens-surveillance-center-raided-by-hamas/.

[95] This is the constant refrain Bruce Hoffman has repeated to his students for at least 28 years of which I am aware.

[96] See, Hoffman, Anonymous Soldiers, 297-298, for a thorough handling of this group. While the coordinated attacks were perceived as vicious and outrageous at the time, they were also considered effective, see, David B. Green, “This Day in Jewish History: Irgun Blows Up British HQ at Jerusalem’s King David Hotel,” Haaretz, July 22, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2021-07-22/ty-article/this-day-in-jewish-history-irgun-blows-up-british-hq-at-jerusalems-king-david-hotel/0000017f-f5f9-ddde-abff-fdfd85990000, also see, Hoffman, Anonymous Soldiers, 2015, p.338-341 on Irgun’s targeting of the British Embassy in Rome. Finally see, Hoffman, Anonymous Soldiers, p. 482 where Hoffman states, “…an integral and innovative part of the Irgun’s strategy was Begin’s use of daring and dramatic acts of violence to attract international attention to Palestine and thereby publicize simultaneously the Zionists’ grievances against Britain and their claims for statehood.”

[97] “1970: Hijacked Jets Destroyed by Guerrillas,” BBC News On This Day, September 1970, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/12/newsid_2514000/2514929.stm, and, “Dawson’s Field Hijackings,” Homeland Security Digital Library, https://www.hsdl.org/c/tl/dawsons-field-hijackings/.

[98] Robert Pape, interview by NPR, “Tamil Tigers: Suicide Bombing Innovators,” Talk of the Nation, May 21, 2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104391493 as well as, Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 145–53.

[99] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2017, 145–153.

[100] See, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004) for an exhaustive explanation of how previous tactics were put together in new ways to escalate violence levels to the largest terrorist attack in history.

[101] Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (Regan Arts, 2015) and William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (St. Martin’s Press, 2015), also see Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS (Doubleday, 2015) and see Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror.

[102] See, Simon Cottee, Watching Murder: ISIS, Death Videos and Radicalization (Routledge, 2022), and, “ISIS Fighters Films Their Own Death on GoPro Camera at Hands of Syrian Regime,” Al Arabiya English, September 23, 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2017/09/23/ISIS-fighters-films-their-own-death-on-Go-Pro-camera-at-hands-of-Syrian-regime, or Aamna Mohdin, “Watch: A GoPro Video of What It’s Like to Live and Die as an ISIL Fighter,” Quartz, April 30, 2016, https://qz.com/673375/watch-a-gopro-video-shows-life-and-death-from-an-isil-fighters-point-of-view.

[103] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Penguin Books Limited, 1966; reprint, 1991).

[104] A repeated statement from Bruce Hoffman to me over the last 28 years.

[105] Fernando Reinares, “Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 5 (2011): 780-803, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.613307.

[106] Barbara F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them, (Crown, 2022) and, Bradley Onishi, Preparing for War: The Extremist History of White Christian Nationalism and What Comes Next (Broadleaf, 2023).

[107] For instance, Yann Tessier, “Hundreds of Thousands Rally Across Cities to Support Palestinians,” Reuters, October 28, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/thousands-join-pro-palestinian-protest-london-demand-gaza-ceasefire-2023-10-28/.

[108] Kenichi Sereno, “Tens of Thousands Have Joined Pro-Palestinian Protests Across the United States. Experts Say They Are Growing,” PBS NewsHour, December 15, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/tens-of-thousands-have-joined-pro-palestinian-protests-across-the-united-states-experts-say-they-are-growing.

[109] For instance, “Emotions Run High at Pro-Israel and Pro-Palestinian Demonstrations Around the World,” AP World News, November 17, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-protests-rallies-photo-gallery-20aeec4fb50c7cf4e51f0e5474ef06e7.

[110] “Israel Assassinates Hamas Leader Saleh al-Arouri in Lebanon’s Beirut,” Middle East Eye, January 2, 2024, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lebanon-car-explosion-south-beirut-kills-hamas-leader.

[111] Joe Ward, “Clientelism and Proxy Conflict: The Dangers That Lie Ahead for a Weakened Lebanese State,” Institute for Peace and Security Studies, October 24, 2021, https://jasoninstitute.com/clientelism-and-proxy-conflict-the-dangers-that-lie-ahead-for-a-weakened-lebanese-state/ or, “Hezbollah is the Long Arm of Iran,” American Jewish Committee Global Voice, https://www.ajc.org/news/hezbollah-is-the-long-arm-of-iran-factsheet-5.

[112] Hezbollah Statements, “Hezbollah Mourns Martyr Arouri: Our Fighters’ Fingers are on the Trigger,” Al Manar TV, January 2, 2023, https://english.almanar.com.lb/2015092. For a more complete explanation on how to use the SIAM framework in this arena, see, Brannan and Strindberg, “The Social Identity Analytical Method,” and, Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward.

[113]Oliver Stuenkel, The BRICS and the Future of Global Order, 2nd ed. (Lexington Books, 2023). 

[114] Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford University Press, 2015).

[115]Thessa Lageman, “Remembering Mohamed Bouazizi: The Man Who Sparked the Arab Spring,” Al Jazeera, December 17, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/12/17/remembering-mohamed-bouazizi-his-death-triggered-the-arab. The Strindberg comment has been made repeatedly over the last decade in

Unconventional Threat class discussions at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

[116] Ali Fa, “The Iranian–Saudi Hegemonic Rivalry,” German Council on Foreign Relations, October 26, 2017, https://www.dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27416, or, Creede Newton, “Saudi-Iran Proxy Wars: In Pursuit of Regional Hegemony,” Al Jazeera News, November 14, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/14/saudi-iran-proxy-wars-in-pursuit-of-regional-hegemony.

[117] See, See, McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, and, Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, for descriptions of out-group focus for this distinct type of terrorist group.

[118] Mary Habeck, “Al-Qaida and Hamas,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 2 (February 2010), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-qaida-and-hamas-the-limits-of-salafi-jihadi-pragmatism/.

[119] Joseph Jay Helman, “The Politics of Patron-Client Relationships: The United States and Israel 1948-1992,” The Journal of American History 90, no. 1 (2003): 350–420, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3659964 or for a popular rather than academic perception, “Examining the US-Israel Patron-Client Relationship Ahead of Biden’s Middle East Visit,” People’s Dispatch, July 11, 2022, https://peoplesdispatch.org/2022/07/11/examining-the-us-israel-patron-client-relationship-ahead-of-bidens-middle-east-visit/.

[120] Maggie Astor, “The Photo That Changed the Course of the Vietnam War,” New York Times, February 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/world/asia/vietnam-execution-photo.html.

[121] Patricia McCormick, “The Girl in the Kent State Photo,” The Washington Post, April 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2021/04/19/girl-kent-state-photo-lifelong-burden-being-national-symbol/.

[122] Jane Recker, “Fifty Years Later, Kim Phuc Phan Thi Is More Than ‘Napalm Girl,’” Smithsonian Magazine, June 10, 2022, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/kim-phuc-phan-thi-napalm-girl-180980227/.